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Conclusion
The future of the loan industry in Louisiana is uncertain. Al-
most everyone agrees that finance companies are necessary, but
they disagree as to rates, pre-payment refunds, collection meth-
ods, and miscellaneous charges. What effect, if any, the federal
Truth-in-Lending Act 37 will have on loan companies is unknown.
The Act does not contain rate controls nor does it provide for a
refund of unearned interest.3s
There may, however, be hope for the unwary borrower should
Louisiana adopt the Uniform Commercial Code.3 9 The UCC has a
provision 40 that could enable the court to find as a matter of law
that the discounting of exorbitant interest is unconscionable and
thereby take appropriate action. The outcome of the court's find-
ing would depend entirely upon their definition of the term
"unconscionable." The UCC does not attempt to define the term,
thus leaving much discretion in the courts.
Herschel C. Adcock
MANDAMUS-COMPELLING AN OFFICIAL TO PERFORM
DISCRETIONARY DUTY
Plaintiffs, desiring to complete a course in barber college,
were unable to fulfill the requirements within the time alloted
by law' and sought an extension from the Louisiana State
Board of Barber Examiners. The Board, "in its discretion,"'2
refused to allow the requested extension and plaintiffs brought
enabling them, for the first time in most states, to actually have a meaningful op-
portunity to shop for the best credit buy."
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1968).
38. A bill such as La. H.B. 556, even though it contained some inequitable
provisions, would have been a welcome relief.
39. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code; however, the Louisiana Law Institute is presently studying the UCC with
an eye toward its possible adoption by Louisiana.
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302: "(1) If the court as a matter of
law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable
at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may
so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscion-
able result.
"(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination."
1. LA. R. S. 36:363 (1950).
2. Id. 36:366 gives the Board the power to extend the time permitted for com-
pletion of the required course. To give, or not to give, an extension is within the
Board's discretion, but it may only grant an extension upon a showing of good
cause.
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suit seeking a writ of mandamus compelling the Board to grant
the additional time. On appeal, in affirming the trial court's
dismissal, the First Circuit held that the writ of mandamus
would not lie to compel a discretionary duty even if there had
been an abuse of that discretion. State ex rel. Hayes v. Louisiana
State Board of Barber Examiners, 208 So.2d 369 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 252 La. 169, 210 So.2d 53 (1968). 3
The function of the extraordinary writ of mandamus is to
provide a legal action which can be used to compel the per-
formance of certain duties or acts. 4 Historically, mandamus has
been the proper remedy for such cases, and has been viewed
as clearly drawing the issue whether or not a public official
has acted in an illegal manner, including whether he has grossly
abused the discretion entrusted to him. Being a summary pro-
ceeding,5 it was designed and traditionally used to afford a
degree of relief unavailable through ordinary proceedings.6
The Louisiana law prior to the Code of Civil Procedure of
1960 appears to have been that mandamus would not lie to
reach or correct the performance of any duty which, in manner
or degree, was discretionary with a public board or official.7
The courts refused to "second guess" an administrative body on
a discretionary question, fearing that the judgment of the courts
might eventually become substituted for that of the agencies.
However, the courts also established an exception to the above
3. This holding was relied on and reaffirmed in a later First Circuit case
which denied the relator's petition for a writ of mandamus to-be issued to compel
the State Banking Commissioner to issue to relator a small loan license on the
ground that the writ of mandamus will not compel the performance of a discre-
tionary duty even where there had been a gross abuse of discretion. State ex rel.
Citizen's Fin. of Hammond v. James, 213 So.2d 64 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968). Al-
though the Hayes opinion referred to "abuse," the Citizen's Fin. case expanded the
holding to include the term "gross abuse."
4. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3861-3867.
5. Id. arts. 3781, 3862.
6. Id. arts. 2591-2595. See also note 34 infra.
7. State ex rel. Eberle v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 221 La. 243, 59 So.2d
177 (1952) State ex rel. Hutton v. City of Baton Rouge, 217 La. 857, 47 So.2d
665 (1950) ;Houeye v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 213 La. 807, 35 So.2d 739
(1948) ; City of Gretna v. Parish of Jefferson, 161 La. 406, 108 So. 787 (1926) ;
State ex rel. Guion v. Chauvin, 1.47 La. 703, 85 So. 645 (1920) ; State ex rel.
Citizen's Bank of La. v. Webre, 44 La. Ann. 1081, 11 So. 706 (1892) ; State ex
rel. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. City of New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 268 (1880) ;
State ex rel. St. Martin v. Police Jury of St. Charles Parish, 29 La. Ann. 146
(1877) ; State ex rel. Moncure v. Dubuclet, 28 La. Ann. 698 (1876) ; Hughes v.
Parish Council of East Baton Rouge, 48 So.2d 823 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950);
State ex rel. O'Beirne v. Police Jury of Red River Parish, 16 La. App. 581, 135
So. 57 (3d Cir. 1931) ; Kostmayer v. Police Jury of Jefferson, 1 La. App. 618
(Orl. Cir. 1925). It should be noted that in most of these cases the question of
whether or not a gross abuse of discretion was a basis for granting a writ of man-
damus did not arise or was not necessary to the decision.
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rule in cases of clear and flagrant abuses of vested discretion.,
Though variously worded in many cases," a clear statement of
the rule is:
"While it is the general rule that mandamus may be in-
voked only to coerce the performance of duties that are
purely ministerial in nature, it is well settled in this state
as well as in other jurisdictions that the writ may also be
employed to reach and correct an arbitrary or capricious
abuse of discretion by public boards or officials." 10 (Citations
omitted.)
There is no question that the "gross abuse" exception was a
part of our law prior to 1960, although it seems to have been
jurisprudentially created, since it was not specifically provided
for in the Code of Practice of 1870, but was not inconsistent
with that code.1" The "gross abuse" exception is not peculiar
to Louisiana, but has been established and is accepted in the
common law jurisdictions as well.1 2
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1960 which
govern the use of mandamus are articles 3861-3866. Article
3863 provides that mandamus may be used to compel the per-
8. State ex rel. Torrance v. City of Shreveport, 231 La. 840, 93 So.2d 187
(1957) ; State ex rel. Kohler's Snowite Laundry & Cleaners v. State Bd. of Com-
merce & Industry, 205 La. 622, 17 So.2d 899 (1944) ; Charbonnet v. Board of
Architectural Examiners, 205 La. 232, 17 So.2d 261 (1944) ; Saint v. Irion, 165
La. 1035, 116 So. 549 (1928) ; State ex rel. Peoples State Bank v. Police Jury of
Red River Parish, 154 La. 389, 97 So. 584 (1.923) ; State ex rel. Texas Grading
Co. v. Buie, 144 La. 39, 80 So. 191 (1918) ; State ex rel. Thurmond v. City of
Shreveport, 124 La. 178, 50 So. 3 (1909) ; State ex rel. Galle v. City of New Or-
leans, 113 La. 371, 36 So. 999 (1904) ; State ex rel. Mayor v. Judge, 35 La. Ann.
637 (1833) ; State ex rel. Yglesias v. Soule, 48 So.2d 717 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1950) ; State ex rel. Ratliff v. Village of Roseland, 21 So.2d 96 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1945; State ex rel. Meaux v. Village of Morse, 6 So.2d 221 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1942) ; State ex rel. Fourroux v. Board of Directors of Public Schools of Jefferson
Parish, 3 La. App. 2 (Orl. Cir. 1925). See Notes, 19 TuL. L. REv. 147, 149 (1944),
6 TUL. L. REV. 493, 494 (1932).
9. See cases cited note 8 supra.
10. State ex rel. Torrance v. City of Shreveport, 231 La. 840, 846, 93 So.2d
187, 189 (1957). This case was relied on by the relators in the instant case but
was held to have been overruled by the 1960 Code. See State ex rel. Hayes v.
Louisiana St. Bd. of Barber Examiners, 208 So.2d 369, 371 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1968).
11. State ex rel. Hayes v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Barber Examiners, 208 So.2d
369, 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968). See La. Code of Practice arts. 829-844 (1870).
12. 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 63 (c) (1948) : ". . . [T]he great weight of authority
is to the effect than an exception to the general rule that discretionary acts will
not be reviewed or controlled [by mandamus] exists when the discretion has been
abused, if the facts otherwise justify the issuance of the writ. [footnotes omitted]."
Accord, 34 AM. Jun. Mandamus §§ 66-69, 126 (1951) ; 2 W. BAILEY, HABEAS
CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES §§ 201 (1913); F. FERRIS, THE LAW OF ExTRA-
ORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES §§ 206, 209 (1926) ; 2 T. SPELLING, INJUNCTION AND
OTHER EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES § 1433 (2d ed. 1901) ; Note, 5 TUL. L. REv.
149 (1930).
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formance of a "ministerial duty required by law." Comment (b)
thereunder states that "The following rules established by the
jurisprudence are retained: .... It may be used only to compel
the performance of purely ministerial duties."
Since the adoption of the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure,
other Louisiana courts of appeal 13 have held still apropos the
rule that mandamus will lie to review and correct an arbitrary
and capricious gross abuse of discretion by a public board or
official. 14
After recognizing the former law1 5 and this post-1960 juris-
prudence,16 the court in Hayes nonetheless felt that "the pro-
visions of Articles 3861 and 3863 of the Code of Civil Procedure
preclude such an interpretation."'17 (Emphasis added.) The court
seemed to place considerable emphasis upon Comment (b) under
Article 3863, mentioned previously. The court reasoned that by
this language the legislature had "rejected the use of mandamus
to compel the performance of any discretionary duty by a public
officer or board, even in cases in which there had been an abuse
of discretion.""' This decision, if accepted, will obviously work
a substantial change in the use of writ of mandamus in Louisi-
ana.1 9 Such a change is neither desirable nor necessary under
our Code.
There are three grounds which the courts may employ in
retaining the "gross abuse" exception. First, in considering the
requirements of the Code, a " 'Ministerial' duty is to be dis-
13. See specific cases of the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits in note 14
infra.
14. Deville v. City of Oakdale, 180 So.2d 556 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) ; La-
martinere v. Daigrepont, 168 So.2d 373 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (referring spe-
cifically to art. 3863) ; Cloud v. Bushnell, 168 So.2d 275 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964),
writs refused, 247 La. 299, 170 So.2d 509 (1965) ; Lambert v. La Bruyere, 154
So.2d 466 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; West Carroll Nat. Bank of Oak Grove v.
West Carroll Parish School Bd., 136 So.2d 699 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; State
ex rel. Summit Fid. & Surety Co. v. Police Jury of Itapides Parish, 131 So.2d
623 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
15. See text at note 8 supra.
16. See note 14 supra.
17. State ex rel. Hayes v. Louisiana State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 208
So.2d 369, 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
18. Id. In State ex -el. Citizen's Fin. of Hammond, Inc. v. James, 213 So.2d
64, 65 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), this was clarified by using the term "a gross
abuse" instead of "an abuse" as was used here. See note 3 supra.
19. 208 So.2d 369, 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968). It is interesting to note that
even the defendant in Hayes, in his appellate brief, admitted and acknowledged
the existence of the "gross abuse" exception, his argument being that as the re-
lator did not allege facts sufficient to establish a showing of genuine "gross
abuse," the application of the exception was not presently proper. Brief for Ap-
pellee at 3, 4, State ex rel. Hayes v. Louisiana State Bd. of Barber Examiners,
208 So.2d 369 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
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tinguished from discretionary power, that is to say, where a
choice is confided to the official. '2 0 A ministerial duty is one
which is performed without requiring the exercise of judgment,
in obedience to some clear command.2 1 Article 3863 and Comment
(b) thereunder limit the use of mandamus to only compelling
the performance of ministerial duties. With reference to the
distinction between "ministerial" and "discretionary" duties,
this limitation is exactly the same as a rule excluding the use
of mandamus to compel discretionary duties. 2  The basis for
this juggling of words is that the two terms are mutually ex-
clusive.13 Thus, the former jurisprudential rule that mandamus
will not lie to compel a discretionary duty has been stated in
other words in Article 3863 and its comments. The gross abuse
exception was a part and parcel of this rule before it was restated
in the 1960 Code.24 In view of the fact that mandamus is so
well suited to meet the needs of justice, and has been the tra-
ditional remedy in cases of gross abuse, it does not seem profit-
able to hold that the redactors, in an attempt to use positive
rather than negative phraseology,2 5 intended to eliminate the
use of mandamus in such cases. The courts, therefore, could
hold that the new statute itself retains the pre-1960 "gross
abuse" exception to the non-availability of mandamus.
Secondly, the Hayes ruling raises possible constitutional
problems. It is beyond doubt that a public officer or agency
cannot lawfully be vested with unfettered and unreviewable
discretion. If such were possible, blatantly unconstitutional
actions could be maintained as long as they were the product
of discretion instead of legislation.
In Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield26 the
United States Supreme Court said:
"The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to secure every person within the
20. Sachse, Justice-The Duty of the State To Submit to the Legal Process,
18 LA. L. REV. 437, 442 (1958).
21. Although some interpretation of law and determination of fact is neces-
sary, the duty may still be ministerial. Cook v. City of Shreveport, 163 La. 518,
112 So. 402 (1927) ; State ex rel. Warren Realty Co. v. Montgomery, 43 So.2d 33
(La. App. Or]. Cir. 1950) ; Dupuy v. Jones, 15 So.2d 528 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1943).
22. Instead of using a negative expression excluding the use of mandamus in
cases of discretionary duties, the redactors simply made use of a positive limitation.
23. See notes 7, 8, 18, and 20-22 supra; BLACK, LAW DICTIoNARY 1148 (4th
ed. 1957).
24. See notes 8, 12, and 14 supra.
25. See note 22 supra.
26. 247 U.S. 350 (1917).
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State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary dis-
crimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute
or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents."27
It has been further held, in Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control
Comm'n,2S that the federal government has the right to insure
that state regulations of franchises, property rights, and mere
privileges granted or withheld by the state at its pleasure are
not determined in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. 29 As
early as 1904 the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that a dis-
cretionary power, in order to escape unconstitutionality, must
not be arbitrarily or unjustly exercised3 ° These constitutional
limitations are clearly illustrated by noting that the exact cause
of action dismissed by the state court in State ex rel. Citizens
Fin. Co. of Hammond v. James31 has been presented in federal
district court, alleging a violation of plaintiff's right to equal
protection of the laws.32 In an identical case, the same court
recently ordered a preemptory writ of mandamus to issue, com-
pelling the defendant to issue to plaintiff the small loan license
sought.33 It is submitted, therefore, that the state courts cannot
constitutionally refuse to review a gross abuse of discretion by
official state agents, thereby giving them an unlimited discre-
tion.34
27. Id. at 352.
28. 160 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1947).
29. Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 99, 100 (6th Cir.
1947). Accord, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) ; Walton v. City of
Atlanta, 181 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1950).
30. State ex rel. Galle v. City of New Orleans, 113 La. 371, 36 So. 999 (1904).
31. See note 3 supra.
32. Specifically, a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964) was alleged. Citi-
zen's Fin. of Hammond, Inc. v. James, Civil No. 68-167 (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. La.,
filed October 11, 1968). The action was later dismissed when the license sought
was voluntarily granted. Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Nov. 5, 1968, § B, at
6, col. 3.
33. Citizen's Fin. Co. of Covington, Inc. v. James, Civil No. 67-173 (U.S.
Dist. Ct., E.D. La., filed March 29, 1968). The only distinguishing difference in
the two cases is the location of the business offices, one being in Hammond, La.,
and the other being in Covington, La.
34. It must be noted that the new Administrative Procedure Act of 1967 does
provide a method of review of certain administrative decisions. LA. R. S. 49:451-
466 (Supp. 1967). The reviewing court is empowered to reverse an administrative
decision for stated reasons, one of which is a finding that the decision was "arbi-
trary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion ..." Id. 49:964(G) (5). Insofar as an agency decision may
be reviewed under this statute, the constitutional argument presented above loses
force; however, since the statute specifically preserves any other actions that
might be taken to obtain relief, the first and third grounds given in the text for
reversing Hayes remain unimpaired. Id. 49:964(A). In determining the effect of
the new act, it is significant that its provisions are applicable only to state agency
(id. 49:951(2)) decisions or orders which are required to be preceded by notice and
opportunity for a hearing. Id. 49:951(3). Further, certain state agencies are ex-
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In light of the above observations, a third rationale is pos-
sible; that is, admitting the Hayes interpretation to read a
constitutional test into Article 3863.
It can be said that even when one has it within his dis-
cretion to perform or not to perform, he is nevertheless under
a ministerial duty to exercise his discretion in a lawful manner.
That lawful manner is determined by the grant of authority
he has received and by the United States Constitution. As noted
above,35 the Constitution requires that discretionary duties not
be performed in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable man-
ner. A "ministerial" duty, provided by the clear command of the
Constitution, exists to exercise one's authority and discretion
in a reasonable fashion. Thus, the courts could uphold the statute
by reading a "reasonableness" requirement into the definition
of "ministerial."
The holding of Hayes unnecessarily limits the use of man-
damus, and though not necessary under the Code, is unconsti-
tutional unless tempered with a "reasonableness" requirement.36
The proper and more desirable conclusion is that the juris-
prudentially created "gross abuse" exception is not precluded
by the Code of Civil Procedure.
Jerry F. Davis
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BECAUSE OF SIMULATED CONSENT
The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court declared null a
marriage in which the man's consent was obtained because of
the woman's mistaken claim that she was pregnant.' The record
shows that the formalities of law necessary for a valid marriage
were observed and that the outward manifestations of the
parties were to enter into a valid marriage. The girl believed
she was pregnant and in order to avoid the embarrassment and
cepted from the provisions of the act. Id. 49:951(2)(C). Thus, as beneficial as
the Administrative Procedure Act is, it does not moot the arguments presented in
this Note, especially when one begins to enumerate the many remaining state, par-
ish, and municipal agencies which are vested with discretion which, if abused,
could easily prejudice substantial rights.
35. See text at notes 26-31 supra.
36. It is interesting to note that in the Introduction to Title III of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure (Ewtraordinary Remedies) it is stated, in a
"Summary of Procedural Changes in Title II" by the late Henry G. McMahon
that: "The only changes in the procedural rules governing the extraordinary reme-
dies of habeas corpus, mandamus, and quo warranto are those made by Art. 2823
[which relates to service of habeas corpus]." (Emphasis added.)
1. McDonald v. Galloway, No. 29063, La. 22d Judicial District (1968).
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